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CASE NOTES

'

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Evidence-Wyoming Procedure on the Admissibility
of Confessions. Kirk v. State, 421 P.2d 487 (Wyo. 1966).

Richard Kirk was convicted of first-degree murder in
the District Court, Lincoln County, pursuant to a trial in
which the testimony of an eye-witness and a confession by the
defendant Kirk were admitted into evidence. The defense
took exception, claiming that the court committed prejudicial
error, inter alia,by admitting defendant's handwritten statement and its typed copy into evidence. During the trial the
court, on its own motion and prior to the testimony of the
witness that would testify as to the voluntariness of the confession, called for a preliminary hearing without the presence of
the jury in order to determine the issue of coercion relating
to the taking of the confession. After the examination of the
witness by both parties, there being no objection or conflicting evidence introduced by the defense, the trial was resumed
with the confession being admitted into evidence. The jury
was allowed to hear the same evidence that was adduced at
the hearing bearing upon the voluntariness of the confession.
Following the witness' testimony, the court instructed the jury
to the effect that they were to disregard the confession if they
found it to have been involuntarily submitted by the def endant.' The only time the defense objected to the admission of
the confession was after the State had rested its case and after conflicting testimony by the defendant as to how he had
killed the victim was put in evidence. 2 In a divided court, the
Supreme Court of Wyoming held that the trial court did not
err in admitting the confession and concomitant testimony as
to its voluntariness into evidence pursuant to a preliminary
hearing on the issue of coercion.
The court cited Jackson v. Denno8 as delineating accept1. The court's instruction read as follows:
You are instructed that unless you believe from the evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the defendant made the same and that he
made it freely, voluntarily and without compulsion, persuasion or
promises, and was not induced by duress, threats, coercion, fear, or
through any improper influence, you will then reject the same and
not consider it for any purpose whatsoever.
Kirk v. State, 421 P.2d 487, 497 (Wyo. 1966).
2. The defense predicated its belated objection on the ground that the statement was not voluntary and asked that its objection be given a retroactive
affect on the record to the time the statement was offered in evidence.
The court denied this request. Ibid.
3. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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able procedure to be followed by state tribunals.' The Jackson case expressly overruled New York procedure pertaining
to the admissibility of a confession in regard to the issue of
coercion. Under the New York rule the trial judge excluded
the confession by a preliminary determination if he found that
under no circumstances could the confession be deemed voluntary; but if the evidence presented a fair question as to its
voluntariness, as where certain facts bearing on the issue were
in dispute or where such evidence was objected to because of
the prejudicial inferences drawn from undisputed facts, the
confession was to be admitted into evidence, leaving to the
jury, under proper instructions, the ultimate determination
of its voluntary character and truthfulness.'
In writing the majority opinion for Jackson, Mr. Justice
White alluded to the jurisdictions that followed the Massachusetts rule and to those adhering to the orthodox rule,6 as
those states that were in accord with due process. Under the
Massachusetts rule, the jury passed on voluntariness only after the judge had fully and independently resolved the issue
against the accused. The jury was instructed that it must also
find that the confession was voluntary before it was to consider it in arriving at a verdict.' The so called orthodox rule
is similar to the Massachusetts rule, the only difference being
that in the former admissibility is determined solely by the
judge, the jury being instructed that they are only to consider the evidence as to voluntariness as it affects the weight
or credibility of the confession.8 The entire court in Kirk felt
that the trial judge was correct in calling a preliminary hearing without the presence of the jury for the purpose of determining the voluntariness of the confession.9 However, the
dissent felt that the question as to voluntariness of the confession was not adequately and emphatically resolved at the
hearing so as to be in accord with the Jackson criteria, viz.,
that the procedure used be a reliable and clear-cut determina4. The court stated: "These procedures must, therefore, be fully adequate
to insure a reliable and clear-cut determination of the voluntariness of the
confession, including the resolution of disputed facts upon which the
voluntariness may depend." Id. at 391.
5. Id. at 877.
6. Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 1205 (1964).
7. See Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 313 Mass. 590, 48 N.E.2d 630 (1945).
8. 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 861 (3d ed. 1940).
9. Kirk v. State, eupra note 1, at 491, 497.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol2/iss2/10

2

Butler: Constitutional Law - Evidence - Wyoming Procedure on the Admissib

1967

CASE NOTES

465

tion of the voluntariness of the confession, including the resolution of disputed facts.
The Jackson case will continue to have a profound influence on Wyoming procedure in the future as already it has
through Kirk in that when another opportunity presents itself, Jackson will delineate further the acceptable procedure
to be applied by the state tribunals so as to accord with the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of due process." The dissent took issue with not only the failure of the
trial court to more resolutely heed the Jackson caveat, but also with the trial judge's indefinite conclusion that no dispute
existed in regard to the issue of voluntariness, since no objection had been made by the defendant. The dissent felt that
the rule1" barring admission of a coerced confession was of
such importance, that a dispute as to its validity was to be
presumed, regardless of the absence of an expressed objection
by the defendant. 8 The Kirk case not only gave the Supreme Court of Wyoming the opportunity to review Wyoming procedure, but it did markedly change the law of Wyoming. The only case in Wyoming prior to Kirk that had a bearing on this point was the 1906 case of Clay v. State4 which
was strikingly similar in procedure to the New York rule
that was overruled in Jackson.5 The only distinguishing feature of the Clay procedure from that of New York prior to
Jackson was that if the jury found the confession to be voluntary, it was to consider the surrounding circumstances leading up to the confession along with the other evidence in the
case, and give to them such weight as in their judgment they
10. Jackson v. Denno, eupra note 3.
11. Cohen, Developments In The Law--Confession8, 79 H1iV. L. Rav. 935, 1061
(1966).
12. Of this rule Cohen states:
The rule excluding a coerced confession is more than a rule excluding
hearsay. Whatever may be said about the orthodox reasoning that
its exclusion is on the ground of its probable falsity, the fact is that
the considerations which call for the exclusion of a coerced confession
are those which call for the protection of every citizen, whether he
be in fact guilty or not guilty. And the rule of exclusion ought not
to be emasculated by admitting the evidence and giving to the jury
an instruction which, as every judge and lawyer knows, cannot be
obeyed.
Ibid.
13. The dissent stated to the effect that the very nature of the hearing presupposes a dispute between the parties and cited dictum in Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), as support for such contention. Kirk v. State,
supra note 1, at 498.
14. 15 Wyo. 42, 86 Pac. 17 (1906).
15. Rames, Wyoming Procedure-Re-Admissibilityof Confessions, 19 Wyo. L. J.

203 (1965).
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were entitled.' As is apparent, the Kirk case is quite a digression from Clay. The dissent in Kirk desired a greater digression than did the per curiam judges in that the former favored a rule' that would require the trial judge to resolve
the issue of voluntariness by a complete hearing, culminating
with a definite statement by the trial judge on whether the
confession was voluntary and admissible or involuntary and
inadmissible. The per curiam opinion in Kirk felt that since
there was no dispute as to the coercion issue, the trial judge
was warranted in terminating the hearing prematurely without ruling one way or the other on the issue of coercion. The
dissent thought that the mere fact that a hearing was called
in the first place was indicative of a dispute over the voluntariness of the confession ;"8 and this assumption fails to take
into account other reasons the trial judge might have entertained for calling the hearing, e.g., as a precautionary measure in view of the Jackson caveat. Futhermore, the Jackson
case did not definitely state whether the judge should make an
emphatic ruling as to the voluntariness of the confession. In
fact, Jackson seemed to infer that the record of the preliminary hearing could be a substitute for a definite statement on
the part of the trial judge. 9
In view of the Jackson case, Kirk procedure
is in accord
with due process in that it is similar to the Massachussetts
rule. The trial court in Kirk went through the formality of
a preliminary hearing on its own motion which tends to
negative the idea of an existing dispute over the admissibility
of the confession. In this regard the per curiam opinion in
Kirk seems correct in its position that, on the record, the problem of Jackson v. Denno is not really involved. The procedure
followed by the trial judge at the preliminary hearing, although rather informal and non-declaratory, was valid as
being within his discretion,- especially when he called for
16. Clay v. State, supra note 14, 86 Pac. at 20.
.17. The dissent favored either the orthodox rule or the Massachusetts rule
as acceptable procedure. Kirk v. State, supra note 1, at 498.
18. Ibid.
19. "The judges' conclusions are clearly evident from the record since he
either admits the confession into evidence if it is voluntary or rejects it
if involuntary. Moreover, his findings upon disputed issues of fact are
expressly stated or may be ascertainable from the record." (emphasis
supplied). Jackson v. Denno, supra note 3, at 379.
20. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953). Jackson upheld Stein on this
point, supra note 3, at 391.
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a hearing in the first instance as a precautionary measure.
The United States Supreme Court indicated in Jackson that
the State procedures used had to be reliable and clear-cut"'
in order to resolve the disputed issue of coercion. The main
distinguishing feature between the Jackson case and Kirk is
that in the former there was a dispute over the voluntariness
of the defendant's statement,2 2 while in the latter no dispute
existed. The preliminary hearing was called in the Kirk case
to afford the defense an opportunity to object and to bring
in evidence of coercion. When the trial judge at the hearing
was not confronted with a dispute over the issue of coercion,
he, in his discretion, prematurely ended the hearing and a'dmitted the confession,22 albeit, he did not formally rule on
the voluntariness of the confession. Had there been a dispute
presented at the hearing, the judge would have had the opportunity to resolve it one way or the other by a ruling.
Since the Jackson case, New York has followed the Massachusetts rule, 24 but has qualified the Jackson criteria to exclude the cases that have already been concluded wherein
there was no hearing on the voluntariness issue by virtue
of the fact that no objection was seasonably made to the admission of the confession.2 5 In view of the latest New York
case,"5 Kirk would require no preliminary hearing since the
defense did not raise an objection at the prudent time. However, Jackson seems to infer that New York is not to be considered the ultimate authority on this point.
The Kirk procedure definitely follows the Massachusetts
rule, which seemingly has the approval of the United States
Supreme Court, but yet the Kirk procedure is not the Mass21. Jackson v. Denno, supra note 3.
22. "[Tlhis is not a case where the facts concerning the circumstances surrounding the confession are undisputed and the task is only to judge the
voluntariness of the confession based upon the clearly established facts
and in accordance with proper constitutional standards." (emphasis supplied). Id. at 391.
23. Note that:
[Tihe admission of a confession, where it is not objected that it was
not voluntary, does not ordinarily constitute error, especially where
there is a prima fade showing of its voluntary character, and a failure
to exclude a confession has been held not to be erroneous where accused
offered no testimony to show its involuntary character, and made no
motion to exclude it.
23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1087 (1961).
24. People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179 (1965).
25. Id. at 185.
26. Ibid.
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achusetts rule. Kirk says that a preliminary hearing is necessary in order (1) to ascertain if there exists a dispute over
the issue of coercion in the first instance, and (2) simply
to admit the confession into evidence after finding that there
exists no dispute. Jackson, by approving the Massachusetts
rule via dictum, would say that a preliminary hearing is necessary (1) to ascertain whether there is a dispute over the
admissibility of the confession, (2) to afford the trial judge
the opportunity to make a definite ruling on the voluntary
character of the confession, albeit, a dispute may not have existed in the first instance, and (3) to admit the confession
into evidence if it is found to be voluntary at the preliminary
hearing. Jackson would seem to uphold Kirk, not on the procedural criteria of the Massachusetts rule dictum, viz., (2)
above, but for the reason that Kirk can be distinguished from
Jackson on the facts. However, the Kirk procedure fails as a
reliable precedent for Wyoming in that the procedure for
resolving the issue of coercion in Kirk does not have the legal efficacy that Jackson seems to presage; a fortiori, Kirk illustrates the plausibility of a criminal code for Wyoming that
would require the Jackson or Massachusetts rule criteria.
FREDRIC B. BUTLER
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